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GLOBAL PUBLIC ECONOMICS: PUBLIC GOODS AND EXTERNALITIES. 
 
Some time ago, when I was in a process of writing an article on public goods1 for the second 
edition of The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, I asked my editor whether there would 
be a separate entry on “Global public goods”; if not, I would like to include some material on 
this topic. He replied that there would not in fact be a separate article, and that I was welcome 
to go ahead with my plans. He then added that he had searched the electronic master list for 
all entries and was amazed to see how many authors had introduced their articles by using the 
word “global”. Interestingly, however, it turned out that in all these cases “global” referred to 
analytical concepts like global curvature and global games, not to global economic issues in 
the sense that I am using the word here. Perhaps this is an indication that we economists - and 
public economists in particular - tend to pay too little attention to problems that concern the 
world as a whole, and it is with the hope of contributing to a more global perspective on our 
subject that I have chosen this topic for my presentation2.  
 
Global public goods is of course not an entirely neglected topic in the recent literature. E.g., 
there have recently come out two collections of articles (Kaul, Grunberg and Stern 1999 and 
Kaul, Conceicao, Le Goulven and Mendoza 2003) that look both at the theory, the empirical 
relevance and the implications for economic policy. Another sign that the interest in the field 
is increasing is the fact that it has been chosen as the theme of the 2007 Congress of the 
International Institute of Public Finance. 
 
The theoretical basis. 
 
The obvious starting point for any application of the theory of public goods is the original 
contribution by Paul Samuelson (1954, 1955). His classic papers contain few explicit 
references to the jurisdictional framework in which decisions about public goods provision 
are assumed to take place, but a natural interpretation is that he primarily had in mind the 
nation-state. However, it is also a reasonable assumption that he saw the theory as being 
applicable to several types of jurisdictional frameworks. Such applications in later years have 
mainly been in the area of local public goods and local public finance. Only recently has the 
attention of economists been turned to goods that are public in regard not only to the 
                                                 
1 This article will be a revision and extension of Sandmo (1987). 
2 The text builds on and integrates material from two previous articles of mine (Sandmo, 2003, 2005). 
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population of a particular country, but with respect to the world population as a whole. The 
qualitative properties of the global environment offer perhaps the most obvious examples of 
such goods, but there are many others. Knowledge is an obvious and important example, 
while public health is another public good with important international dimensions. At the 
institutional level, important examples of global public goods are institutions required to 
promote world peace and international security or to sustain the global market economy. 
 
The Samuelson formulation is cast in the framework of welfare economics. Starting from an 
individualistic welfare function, the aim of the analysis is to characterize an optimal allocation 
of resources when social welfare is maximized subject to a production possibility constraint. 
The most famous result to emerge from the analysis is the “Samuelson rule”: The sum of the 
marginal rates of substitution, taken over all consumers in society, between the public good in 
question and some numéraire private good, must be equal to the marginal rate of 
transformation in production. An alternative interpretation is that the aggregate marginal 
willingness to pay for the public good must equal its marginal cost of production. 
 
A central concern in the following discussion is the question of the validity of the Samuelson 
rule in a global context. Is this the way that we should think about the provision of global 
public goods? If not, what are the changes or modifications that need to be introduced before 
the theory can be applied to this type of public good? It will be shown that the most 
problematic part of the extension concerns the desirability of production efficiency and the 
separation of equity and efficiency conditions which plays such important roles in 
Samuelson’s analysis. 
 
Some of Samuelson’s examples of pure public goods were “an outdoor circus or national 
defense” (Samuelson 1955). Apart from their tongue- in-cheek nature, these are examples 
where we are led to think of the goods being provided by explicit choice of some well-defined 
decision maker, but for many public goods this is a simplified picture. Whether we think of 
the natural or the cultural environment, it is clear that at any point in time these goods are 
partly determined by exogenous forces; they are given by the laws of nature or by human 
activities of the past. Their current and future availability is also determined by the actions of 
a large number of consumers and producers. The effects of these actions are sometimes 
negative, sometimes positive, and at least in the present context it is natural to think of 
externalities as unintended effects of private actions on the availability of public goods. There 
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is accordingly a close connection between the normative theories of public goods and 
externalities.  
 
A model of resource allocation: Basic assumptions. 
 
The notion of a social welfare function, so central to the Samuelson theory of public goods, is 
viewed by many with a good deal of scepticism. This stems partly from the Arrow 
impossibility theorem (Arrow 1951), partly from the criticism by Buchanan3 and others of the 
public choice school that the very notion of an aggregate social welfare function is 
inconsistent with the values of a democratic society. Although the scepticism would seem to 
apply a fortiori to the notion of a global social welfare function, it will, nevertheless, be used 
below. I should stress, therefore, that my use of this concept does not in any way deny the 
force of the Arrow theorem. It is not meant to imply that there exists a political system of 
global preference aggregation, nor that there is a benevolent global planner who manages the 
world's resources according to his ethical values. The role of the social welfare function in the 
following is just to help us understand the limited significance of social efficiency or Pareto 
optimality as the sole guide to rational decisions. Thereby it also helps us to understand the 
dividing line between efficiency considerations on the one hand and ethical judgements on the 
other. 
 
For simplicity, I assume that the world can be thought of as having two countries, one rich 
and one poor. The rich country consists of n consumers with utility functions uiR, where 
i=1,….,n. Similarly, the m consumers of the poor country have utility functions ujP. For 
further simplicity I assume that there is just one private and one (global) public good, so that 
the utility functions can be written as 
 
uiR = uiR(xiR, g)  (i =1,….,n), and  ujP = ujP(xjP, g) ( j =1,….,m).   (1) 
 
Here xiR is the private good consumption of the i'th individual in the rich country, and xjP has a 
corresponding interpretation. The global public good g enters into all utility functions, but the 
subjective valuations of the good may differ between individuals. It is likely to differ between 
                                                 
3 A selection of Buchanan's writings in this area is in Buchanan (1987). 
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the average consumers in the rich and the poor country, and also within the populations of the 
two countries. 
 
The public good, as it is modeled here, is a pure public good in the Samuelson sense. It is 
public both within and between the two countries. The enjoyment of the good by citizen i in 
country R does not diminish its availability for citizen j in country P. This type of public good 
is a polar case which allows us to focus on the problem of global public goods in its purest 
form. However, there are clearly a number of alternatives for theoretical modeling that have a 
higher claim to descriptive realism. Greenhouse gas emissions may have effects on global 
warming while at the same time causing air pollution in the country of origin; reducing 
domestic emissions may therefore simultaneously contribute to a global and a national public 
good. Moreover, since air pollution is mainly generated as a by-product of the consumption 
and production of private goods, it may also be treated as a case of private goods use with 
both national and international external effects. The present focus on pure public goods is 
motivated, first, by the desire to provide a direct extension of the Samuelson model to a global 
context, and, second, to study the problem of incentives in a setting directly comparable to the 
original formulation of the theory. The explicit analysis of externalities will be considered 
below. 
  
The social welfare function is 
 
W = W(u1R,…. unR; u1P,…. umP).       (2) 
 
Note that the maximum of the social welfare function (subject to the production possibilities 
constraint) is necessarily also a global Pareto optimum. For if we have an allocation where we 
can make one consumer, e.g. the poorest individual in the poor country, better off without 
making anyone else worse off, the value of the social welfare function must increase. 
Therefore, such an allocation cannot be a welfare maximum. 
 
The description of the production side of the economy proceeds in two steps. On the one hand 
it is assumed that both countries devote some of their resources to provide the global public 
good, and that the global provision is an increasing function of the individual count ries’ 
contributions. In general, this can be written as 
 
 6 
g = j(gR, gP).          (3) 
 
In the following I shall, for simplicity of exposition, use the more specific assumption that 
 
g = gR + gP.          (3’) 
 
The special assumption that the amount of global public good is equal to the sum of the 
individual countries' contributions is one that in this particular context must mainly be 
justified in terms of analytical simplicity, while it does not affect the nature of the 
conclusions. More generally, however, it is reasonable to assume that the different countries' 
contributions may have a different degree of efficiency in contributing to the global public 
good4.  
 
Each of the countries is constrained in its output of private and public goods by technology 
and factor supplies, and these constraints can be written as 
 
FR(xR, gR) = 0,  and FP(xP, gP) = 0.       (4) 
 
Here xR and xP are the aggregate quantities of private goods produced and consumed in the 
rich and the poor country, respectively, so that SixiR = xR and SjxjP = xP.  
 
Equations (4) give us, for each country, the maximum amount of contribution to the global 
public good that can be achieved for any given amount of private good consumption. Behind 
the efficiency frontier, which is assumed to have the usual concavity properties, lies a number 
of assumptions about the efficient allocation of factors of production among sub-sectors of the 
economy, but for reasons of space these will not be discussed explicitly here. In order to 
facilitate an intuitive interpretation of the results, in the following I will use the quasi- linear 
forms5 
 
xR + CR(gR) – ? R = 0,  and   xP + CP(gP) – ? P = 0.     (4’) 
                                                 
4 In theories of externalities and public goods several alternative assumptions have been explored concerning the 
relationship between individual contributions and the aggregate outcome, of which the case represented by (3') is 
clearly a special although important one. Cornes and Sandler (1996), who survey a number of alternative models, 
refer to the present case as that of a “summation technology”. 
5 A similar form was used by Chichilnisky and Heal (1994). 
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Here ? R and ? P are constants representing the resource limitations of the two economies. The 
functions CR and CP are assumed to be continuous with positive first and second derivatives. 
This ensures that the production possibility curves have the usual properties. Moreover, the 
marginal rates of transformation, which in general should be written as FRg/ FRx and FPg/FPx 
now become simply CRg and CPg. (Here and elsewhere subscripts will be used to denote 
partial derivatives in a notation that should otherwise be self-explanatory.) The latter 
expressions have an obvious interpretation as the marginal cost of producing the public good 
in terms of the quantity of private goods foregone. 
 
Formally, the main difference between the present formulation and the standard one lies in the 
disaggregated treatment of the production side. It is obviously reasonable to assume that 
factor supplies and technologies differ between rich and poor countries, and even more reason 
than in a single-country analysis to be explicit about the conditions for productive efficiency.    
 
Production efficiency. 
 
As a step towards solving the global welfare maximization problem it is accordingly useful to 
examine the more limited issue of world production efficiency. A global allocation of 
resources in this context can be said to be productively efficient if, for some given total of the 
world’s consumption of private goods, the provision of the global public good is at its 
maximum. This might seem to be desirable in view of the wider objective of global welfare 
maximization, for in the absence of production efficiency it would have been possible to 
reallocate the world’s resources so as to have more of the public good without suffering a loss 
of private goods output. Such a reallocation would have the potential to improve the standard 
of living for all. 
 
Formally, the problem of characterizing production efficiency can be written as 
 
Maximize g subject to x R + xP = x0,       (5) 
 
where x0 is some given amount of world output or consumption of the private good. Using 
equations (4’),  production efficiency can be characterized by these and the condition 
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CRg =  CPg.          (6) 
 
This condition says simply that for global production efficiency to hold, the marginal cost of 
public goods must be the same in rich and poor countries. In other words, comparative 
advantage should be fully exploited. The country in which factor endowments and technology 
make it cheaper to produce the public good, should devote more resources to it. 
 
The flavour of the production efficiency result is strongly reminiscent of a classic insight from 
the Heckscher-Ohlin version of the theory of international trade, where the exploitation of 
comparative advantage assures global production efficiency6. In that theory the next step is to 
show that free international trade will establish relative producer prices that are uniform 
across countries. Since, in a competitive equilibrium, these will be equated to the marginal 
rate of substitution in each country, it follows that free trade will result in an efficient 
allocation of production between countries. But international trade theory is almost 
exclusively about trade in private goods. It is interesting to ask under what institutional 
conditions a similar result can be expected to emerge in the context of public goods, and this 
will be considered further below. 
 
Is global production efficiency necessarily desirable? Welfare economics has taught us to 
think that production efficiency is necessary for social welfare maximization; if some outputs 
can be increased with no decrease of other outputs, it must be possible to make it better for 
some consumers without making it worse for others. But in an international context it is not 
clear that this argument can be applied. Our interest in the efficiency problem (5) must 
ultimately derive from the assumption that the whole of world output of the private good is 
available to satisfy consumer needs in both countries; if, instead, national consumption 
possibilities are constrained by national output, the present formulation of the problem loses 
much of its appeal. These issues can only be clarified by embedding the production efficiency 
problem in the wider framework of welfare maximization. 
 
Global welfare maximization. 
 
                                                 
6 This must be understood as relative to the assumption that factors of production are internationally immobile.  
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We now consider the more general problem of global welfare maximization. This will be 
conceived as the maximization of the social welfare function (2) subject to the technological 
constraints (3’) and (4’). In addition, we need to specify the connection between world 
consumption and world production. To begin with, we assume simply that world consumption 
must equal world production, so that 
 
SixiR + SjxjP = xR + xP.        (7) 
 
Solving this problem of constrained optimization we obtain the following three sets of 
optimum conditions: 
 
CRg = CPg º  Cg.         (8) 
 
Si(uiRg/ uiRx) + Sj(ujPg/ ujPx) = Cg .       (9) 
 
WiR uiRx = WjP ujPx.  (i=1,....,n; j=1,....,m)     (10) 
 
Equation (8) is the condition for global production efficiency (6), restated here for 
convenience. This condition ensures that the marginal cost of the public good - the 
opportunity cost of public goods provision in terms of private goods output - is the same in 
both countries, and this common value will be written as Cg.  Equation (9) is a direct 
generalization of the Samuelson efficiency condition for public goods: The sum of the 
marginal rates of substitution between the public and private good - the sum of the 
corresponding sums for each of the countries - should be equal to the global marginal rate of 
transformation. Another way to write this condition is as the requirement that the marginal 
benefit-cost ratio - the ratio of marginal benefits to marginal costs - should be equal to unity, 
i.e. 
 
[Si(uiRg/ uiRx) + Sj(ujPg/ ujPx)]/ Cg = 1.      (9') 
 
Finally, the set of equations (10) is a requirement that the social marginal utility of private 
goods consumption be the same both for all consumers in each of the countries and across 
countries. Together, (8)-(10) constitute a complete characterization of the conditions for an 
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optimal world allocation of resources. While conditions (8) and (9) are characterizations of 
efficiency or Pareto optimality, equations (10) characterize the just or equitable distribution of 
resources between individuals.  
 
At this point the generalization of the Samuelson analysis to an international setting may seem 
straightforward. In particular, the condition for optimal provision of public goods has the 
same form as in the original model, except for the splitting up of the sum on the left-hand side 
into one sum for each country. At the level of utopian thinking about world welfare, this may 
not be very surprising. However, as indicated above, the results are based on the assumption 
that private goods consumption in each of the two countries is only constrained by world 
output, not by the level of output in the country itself. This may be too utopian to be helpful. 
It is true that international trade allows countries to choose consumption patterns outside their 
sets of production possibilities, but the assumption here is stronger than that. Since the single 
private commodity x represents the aggregate of all private consumption goods, national 
consumption can only differ from national production in the case where there  exist transfers 
of consumption or income between countries, and it is this feature of the analysis that leads to 
the equity conditions (10). In other words, the constraint (7) is equivalent to an assumption of 
lump sum transfers not only within each country but also between countries, and it is this 
assumption that allows the neat separation of efficiency and equity considerations in the 
optimal solution. This is exactly similar to the Samuelson analysis. Implicit in the formulation 
is also the requirement that the net revenue from the transfers must be positive and equal to 
the resource cost of public goods provision. 
 
Transfers of this kind should not be ruled out as irrelevant and uninteresting. The amount of 
foreign aid and development assistance is significant and could be increased further; 
moreover, as will be discussed further below, some transfers could be seen as payments for 
public goods supply. Nevertheless, it is also true that most countries in the main have to rely 
on their own resources, and it is therefore of obvious interest to examine the case where 
consumption in each of the two countries is constrained by its own output. This assumption 
can be represented by the two constraints 
 
SixiR = xR,  SjxjP = xP,         (11) 
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and these should be compared with the single condition (7) for the previous case. It must be 
emphasized that (11) does not imply that there is no international trade. With the 
interpretation of the single private good as an aggregate of all goods, the meaning of 
conditions (11) is therefore that the value of production must be equal to the value of 
consumption; in other words, trade must be balanced. By contrast, assumption (7) allows for 
the value of consumption in a single country to be either higher or lower than the value of 
production, and this can only happen through international transfers. Thus, both (7) and (11) 
are consistent with an assumption of free trade; the difference between them is that (11) rules 
out international transfers.7 
 
How does this change of assumption affect the case for production efficiency? First of all, it is 
worth emphasizing that the welfare case for national production efficiency remains valid. If 
one assumes the possibility of national lump-sum redistribution of income, it follows directly 
that the output of the private good should be maximized for any given level of public good 
contribution. In other words, national welfare can always be improved by moving from inside 
the production possibility frontier to some point on it.8 On the other hand, global production 
efficiency is in general not desirable. It is easy to see why. Assume that the two countries are 
initially in a situation where the marginal cost of the public good differs between them. 
Suppose that it is found that the concern for global production efficiency calls for the poor 
country to contribute more to the public good and for the rich country to contribute less. The 
poor country must then move along its production possibility frontier in the direction of less 
production of the private good, while the rich country will produce more. On average then, 
the poor country consumers must get less private goods consumption and the rich country 
consumers must get more. This will involve a welfare loss, on the average, for consumers in 
the poor country, and a corresponding gain to the rich country consumers. If the latter could 
transfer some of their gains to the former, everyone could gain, but it is precisely the inability 
to make these transfers that is implied by assumption (11).  
 
Formally, the condition for optimal supply of public goods in this case can be written as 
 
Si(uiRg/ uiRx)/CRg + Sj(ujPg/ ujPx)/CPg = 1.      (12) 
                                                 
7 The formulation is similar to that in models of international trade with one traded and one non-traded good; for 
an exposition see e.g. Bruce and Purvis (1985), pp. 814-817. 
8 Indeed, Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) showed that under certain conditions the case for production efficiency 
remains valid even when the only instruments for redistribution are distortionary taxes.  
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This equation should be compared with the corresponding equation (9') for the case when  
international transfers are possible; this says that the optimal provision of the global public 
good implies that the marginal benefit-cost ratio for the world as a whole must equal one. By 
contrast, (12) says that without transfers, it is the sum of the national marginal benefit-cost 
ratios that should equal one.9  
 
While (9') represents an obvious extension of the theory of public goods to a global context, 
the interpretation of (12) is less obvious. A country's preferences for the global public good 
should count for more in the evaluation of global benefits, the lower is its marginal cost of 
producing the good; in this way, the aggregation of preferences across countries takes some 
account of production efficiency, which is intuitively reasonable.  
 
But a puzzling feature of condition (12) is the apparent absence of welfare weights. Since 
there is no equalization of the social marginal utility of consumption between the rich and 
poor countries, one would expect the benefits to be weighted by terms that reflect the 
distributional preferences embedded in the social welfare function. Recall that we have 
assumed that there are perfect lump-sum transfers within but not between countries10. 
Consequently, the social marginal utility of consumption will be the same for all consumers in 
the poor country, and also between all consumers of the rich society. Formally, this can be 
written as 
 
WiR uiRx = gR,  WjP ujPx = gP,  (i=1,....,n; j=1,....,m)    (13) 
 
where gR and gP are the common social marginal utility of income for each of the two 
countries. From (12) the relative weight on the poor country's preferences is CRg / CPg . But 
from the solution to the optimization problem it can be shown that this is in fact equal to gP/gR, 
so that (12) has an alternative interpretation in terms of welfare weights. If the global welfare 
function has an egalitarian form, gP/gR >1, and more weight is attached to the preferences of 
the poor population in deciding on the optimal provision of the global public good. 
 
                                                 
9 The derivation of equation (12) is shown in Sandmo (2003). 
10 This is obviously not a realistic assumption. Its use here should be seen as an attempt to capture the idea that 
national redistribution policy is more highly developed than redistribution between countries. 
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The connection between cost weights and welfare weights has an intuitive economic 
explanation. If the social welfare function has an egalitarian bias, so that more weight is 
attached to private goods consumption in the poor country, one would like it to contribute less 
to the global public good. But since the marginal cost of providing the public good is 
increasing, this implies that the marginal cost in the poor country must, in an egalitarian 
optimum, be low compared to that of the rich country. The poor country should therefore 
devote less resources to global public goods than indicated by considerations of comparative 
advantage. 
 
An interesting question is whether the optimum without international transfers would entail a 
higher or lower solution value for the public good than the optimum solution when such 
transfers are possible. However, at the purely 'technological' level, abstracting from all 
incentive problems, no firm answer to this question can be given. Intuitively, whether a 
greater weight on the benefits derived by the poor country will increase or decrease the sum 
of marginal benefit-cost ratios, depends on whether the poor country's benefits are high or low 
compared to that of the rich country. 
 
A natural extension of the present analysis would be to the case where countries mus t finance 
their expenditure on global public goods through distortionary taxes. In that case, countries' 
comparative advantage in the production of global public goods would be based not only on 
differences in marginal production costs but also on differences in the efficiency of their tax 
systems. However, such an extension of the literature on the marginal cost of public funds to 
an international context lies beyond the scope of the present paper and must be left for future 
research.  
 
Global externalities. 
 
A theoretical insight that was first clearly formulated by Pigou (1920) is that market failure 
which is due to negative environmental externalities can be ameliorated by an appropriately 
designed tax system whereby polluters are confronted with a tax that leads them to internalize 
the social effects of their own actions. When all polluters are faced with the same tax rate the 
system will not only lead to an efficient balancing of costs and consumption benefits, but also 
to production efficiency in the sense that the reduction in emissions is achieved at a minimum 
of social costs. Although an efficient allocation can also be achieved through alternative 
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allocation systems, in particular by a system of transferable quotas, Pigouvian taxes will serve 
well as an illustration of the issues involved in extending the principles of environmental 
policy to an international setting. The importance of this particular application of the theory is 
underlined by recent concerns about the emission of greenhouse gases and its effects on 
global warming11.  
 
The analytical model will in essence be the same as before; thus, we will continue to assume 
that there exist perfect redistributive transfers within each of the countries. The main change 
is that we have to assume that there are two private goods instead of just one; without this 
extension we cannot handle the issue of relative price changes. As before, there will be one 
public good which now is in the nature of a “bad”, viz. global environmental pollution, e. The 
utility functions can then be written as  
 
uiR= uiR(xiR0, x iR1, e) (i=1,....,n)  and  ujP= ujP(xjP0, x jP1, e) (j=1,....,m). (14) 
 
Pollution is generated by the global output of commodity 1  according to the simple 
relationship 
        
e=xR1+xP1,         (15) 
 
where xR1 and xP1 denote volumes of production in the two countries. This formulation 
corresponds to equation (3’) in the public goods case. The production constraints take the 
same quasi- linear form as above: 
 
xR0+ CR(xR1)-? R=0,  and  xP0+ CP(xP1)-? P=0.    (16) 
 
In a competitive equilibrium in each of the two countries, taking commodity 0 as the 
numéraire, consumers will equate their “private” marginal rates of substitution (i.e., taking 
the state of the environment as given) to the consumer price of commodity 1 (Q), while 
producers will set their marginal cost equal to the producer price (q) 
 
uiR1/ uiR0=QR,    (i=1,....,n)    (17a)   
                                                 
11 For a recent survey of the main policy issues see Goulder and Pizer (2006). 
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CR1(yR1)=qR.         (18a) 
 
ujP1/ ujP0=QP,    (j=1,....,m)    (17b)   
 
CP1(yP1)=qP.         (18b) 
 
As before, there are two alternative sets of assumptions regarding the relationship between 
production and consumption. There is no need to spell these out in detail, since they 
correspond closely to the alternative assumptions (7) and (11). On the one hand the individual 
countries’ consumption could be constrained only by world output; this corresponds to the 
case of lump sum international transfers. On the other hand, the consumption of each country 
could be constrained by the need for balanced trade. In the first case, the optimal Pigouvian 
tax will be the same in the rich and the poor country and be given by 
 
t=[S i(uiRe/ uiR0)+ S j(ujPe/ ujP0)].      (19) 
 
This is essentially the formula for the optimal Pigouvian tax under first-best conditions 
(Sandmo 2000), where the sum of marginal benefits is taken over all consumers in the two 
countries. The tax induces the consumers to internalize the benefits to the world community 
as a whole of a marginal reduction in the consumption of the polluting commodity. It is 
therefore not surprising that the measure of social benefits is the same as the Samuelson 
measure of the benefits of public goods supply: A reduction in environmental pollution 
implies an improvement of the global environment, which is a public good. 
 
Alternatively, we now assume that the re are no international transfers. A global uniform tax 
will then no longer be optimal. The tax rates in the two countries will be given by12 
 
tR=[Si(uiRe/ uiR0)+ S j(ujPe/ ujP0)(?P/?R)],     (20) 
 
and 
 
                                                 
12 For the derivation of the optimal tax formulae see the Appendix to Sandmo (2005). 
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tP=[Si(uiRe/ uiR0) )(?R/ ?P)+ S j(ujPe/ ujP0)],     (21) 
 
where the term ?P/ ?R is the ratio of the social marginal utilities of income in the two countries. 
These are equal between individuals within each of the countries because of the assumption of 
domestic lump-sum redistribution; see equation (10) above. We assume the global welfare 
function to be egalitarian, so that the weight accorded to the marginal social damage for the 
rich country consumers will be less than that of the consumers in the poor country; this 
implies that ?P/ ?R >1. 
 
Comparing (20) with (21), we see immediately that 
 
tR=tP(?P/ ?R),         (22) 
 
which implies that tR>tP: The optimal tax in the rich country is higher than in the poor 
country. We may think of the ratio of welfare weights as expressing the degree of 
egalitarianism embedded in the global social welfare function. In the limit, as the ratio ?R/ ?P 
approaches zero, giving lexicographic priority to the welfare of the poor country, the tax in 
the poor country goes to zero, and the whole burden of discouraging global pollution falls on 
the tax policy of the rich country13. 
 
Problems of implementation: The evaluation and revelation of benefits. 
 
Suppose that the governments of each country have found a way to estimate national benefits 
from global public goods, including the global environment. This means that they have 
overcome the difficulties that stem from individuals' private incentives to misrepresent their 
benefits in order to avoid paying for public goods14. The next step is now to arrive at a 
measure of global benefits. If we envisage the governments of the world negotiating about an 
environmental treaty, each of them finds itself in a situation which in terms of strategic 
considerations is similar to that of a single individual with respect to the national government. 
Within the interna tional community of nations most countries are small compared to the 
world as a whole. By underreporting its aggregate willingness to pay a country may 
                                                 
13 Issues of efficiency in international taxation have been examined in Keen and Wildasin (2004), but their focus 
is not on externalities and corrective taxes. 
14 For surveys of methods of benefits assessment see Cropper and Oates (1992) or Sandmo (2000, ch. 4). 
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conceivable reduce the amount that it will actually have to cont ribute to the global public 
good without influencing the global provision of such goods appreciably. But if all countries 
reason along similar lines, the result will be under-provision of global public goods. 
 
How serious is this international free rider problem? Again a crucial consideration is the 
availability of policy instruments for international redistribution. Consider first the condition 
(9') for optimal provision with unrestricted international transfers. If this condition is not 
satisfied, it is in principle possible to improve the situation for all countries through a 
combination of public goods adjustment and international transfers. One could envisage a 
system of international bargaining that would make it possible to convert a situation 
characterized by potential Pareto improvement to one of actual improvement, provided that 
the transfer mechanisms were sufficiently fine-tuned and flexible. This would not eliminate 
the incentive problems; individual countries might still find it in their own interest to report 
high costs and low benefits in order to increase their net gains from international transfers. 
Still, the combination of contributions to global public goods provision and income transfers 
would increase the possibility of achieving a global optimum, compared to the case with no 
transfers. 
 
The latter case can be understood by considering condition (12), which generalizes easily to 
an arbitrary number of countries. In the absence of international transfers the marginal 
benefit-cost ratios should sum to unity. But this means that at the global optimum each 
individual country's ratio must be less than one. In other words, since a part of the benefits 
generated by the country in question accrues to other countries, all of them will be asked to 
contribute beyond the point where its marginal benefit-cost ratio equals one. Suppose that 
each country considers only its own welfare. If marginal benefit-cost ratios decline with the 
amount of public goods available, which is a reasonable assumption15, no country would 
voluntarily use resources for global public goods beyond the point where its national benefit-
cost ratio equals unity, but this would imply that the sum of these ratios would be of the order 
of the number of countries in the world, indicating a severe under-provision of global public 
goods.  
 
                                                 
15 This follows if marginal benefits decline and marginal costs increase with the level of provision. 
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We must conclude, therefore, that whatever the difficulties are of achieving efficient and 
equitable provision of global public goods in combination with international transfers of 
income, the difficulties become magnified in the absence of such transfers16.   
 
Some modifications may be in order. The assumption that economic agents always take a 
narrow view of their own self- interest when considering the allocation of resources to public 
goods, is not hardly realistic. Even for single individuals in large economies we observe that 
people voluntarily donate time and money for the purpose of providing public goods. The 
increased concern for the environment in public policy has to a large extent been influenced 
by voluntary organizations that have been acting as pressure groups. Many individuals, 
obviously, do not see themselves as unable to influence aggregate outcomes like the 
allocation of resources to public goods or the design of policies to modify the effects of 
unregulated private actions. What is true for the single individual in the national economy is 
also likely to be true for a single country in the community of nations, particularly so since a 
number of countries are actually quite large relative to the world as a whole. One might 
therefore expect that, at least to some extent, they might be able to internalize the effects of 
their own actions on the state of the global environment 17.  
 
Concluding remarks. 
 
This paper has shown how the theories of public goods and externalities can be generalized to 
an international setting where countries contribute to the provision of global public goods or 
to environmental deterioration. At one level of discourse, the generalization is 
straightforward. Under the assumption of global welfare maximization the Samuelson 
optimality rule for public goods and the Pigouvian tax principles remain valid in a global 
setting. However, some of the assumptions required for the results to hold are distinctly less 
attractive in an international setting than is the case in the context of the nation state. The 
crucial one among these is the availability of individualized lump sum transfers. The political 
feasibility of such transfers is hardly a realistic option even within the context of the nation 
state, and in an international context it is even more doubtful. Nevertheless, this polar case is 
                                                 
16 The combination of anti-pollution measures with international transfers has been discussed in a number of 
contributions to the literature on transfrontier pollution. For a theoretical analysis see Chander and Tulkens 
(1992). Mäler (1991) discusses the problem of practical implementation with numerical illustrations for the case 
of sulphur emissions in Europe.  
17 For a more detailed discussion of the incentive structures for global public goods provision, see Barrett (2001, 
2003). 
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interesting in showing the precise conditions under which the standard optimality conditions 
are valid in an international context. 
 
In order to demonstrate the crucial role of international transfers, we have assumed that, as an 
alternative, lump sum transfers are indeed feasible within the nation state, but that they are 
non-existent between states. In that case the optimality conditions are altered. First, global 
production efficiency is no longer desirable; in the interests of equity, poor countries might 
not be required to contribute as much to global public goods as their comparative advantage 
would otherwise call for. Second, the optimality condition for public goods provision changes 
to the requirement that the sum of the national marginal benefit-cost ratios should be equal to 
one. This condition brings to light an important incentive problem for the global economy, 
since each nation state finds itself in a strategic situation similar to that of the single 
individual in the nation state. To ensure the maximal gain to the world as a whole, each 
country must contribute to a point which, at least at the margin, involves a loss to itself. A 
similar insight holds for the case of externalities: In the absence of international lump sum 
transfers, with an egalitarian social welfare function the environmental benefits accruing to 
the consumers in the poor country should count more heavily in the assessment of global 
benefits. Also, the Pigouvian tax rate should be lower in the poor country than in the rich. 
 
The two model alternatives - unrestricted lump sum international transfers versus no transfers 
at all - are obviously theoretical polar cases of international income redistribution. The more 
general conclusion that can be drawn from the analysis is that the incentive problem is easier 
to overcome when decisions concerning global public goods and externalities are combined 
with a policy of international transfers. Indeed, in the context of rich and poor countries, a 
policy whereby efficiency calls for extensive provision of global public goods by poor 
countries (e.g. preservation of the rain forest or of tropical bio-diversity) would be easier to 
implement if combined with a policy of redistribution. The transfers could in principle be 
designed in such a way that the overall gains from the provision of global public goods could 
be distributed among countries to ensure a positive gain for all. 
 
An interesting perspective on transfers of this kind is to see them as payments for services 
rendered to the rich countries. The rich countries derive benefits from the poor countries' 
provision of global public goods (including environmental improvement), and if the poor 
countries do in fact have a comparative advantage in the production of such goods, the rich 
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countries can “buy” those goods cheaper abroad than at home. Thus, there are possible gains 
from trade here, but it must be kept in mind that to realize the gains one must somehow 
overcome the incentive problems that are inherent and inescapable in all problems of public 
goods allocation. Rich countries can obtain more worldwide bio-diversity - presumably a 
global public good - by paying poor countries to spend more resources on protecting 
endangered species. But a single rich country is nevertheless exposed to the free rider 
incentive to let other rich countries foot the bill.  
 
For transfers of income to play the role envisaged here, they must be designed in a way that is 
rather different from current systems of foreign aid. Economists have sometimes argued in 
favour of non-conditional aid as the best way to overcome international inequality, and this 
would be consistent with the implications of the first version of our theoretical model. But in 
the context of a more restricted and practical role for income transfers, they ought rather to be 
designed so as to make them conditional on contributions to the provision of global public 
goods. 
 
The main difference between public goods provision in the nation state and the global 
economy lies in the link with tax payments. Two differences of principle are of crucial 
importance. The first is that, in the nation state, a tax-financed increase in public goods could 
pass the benefit-cost test without providing gains to each and every citizen. This is because 
the nation state has instruments of enforcement by which it can extract payments also from 
those citizens who are not net beneficiaries from the policy, while the world community of 
sovereign nations does not possess policy instruments of this kind.  In the global community 
participation in the policy must therefore be based on voluntary participation, so that it 
becomes important to develop policy tools that distribute the gains to all participating nations. 
The second difference lies in the possibilities of developing credible systems of enforcement. 
Even when all countries gain from the policies, individual countries would have an incentive 
to engage in various activities - such as misrepresentation of benefits or costs, evasion or 
avoidance of taxes or quotas - that would increase their net share of the global gains further. A 
viable system of global public goods provision must to some extent be based on countries' 
acceptance of a notion of global welfare that goes beyond national self- interest. 
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